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Abstract
We analyze an overlapping generations model where individuals’ wel-
fare depends on the stock of a free access environmental good E and on
the consumption C of a private good.
We assume that the production process of the private good depletes
the natural resource but that specific investments alleviate these damages.
In such context, we show that strategic behaviour and heterogeneity in
preferences may be a source of complex dynamics.
1 Introduction
Understanding the consequences of heterogeneity of economic agents for the
management of common access environmental resources (commons) is one of the
most appealing objectives of environmental economics. Does heterogeneity favor
a sustainable management of commons or instead lead to over-exploitation? No
clear cut answer to this issue emerges from economic literature; in some cases,
the answer is “no”, in others it is “yes”; see e.g. Lekakis and Kousis (2001),
Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson (2002), Cardenas et al. 2002, Dayton-Johnson
and Bardhan (2002), Roca (2003), Potete and Ostrom (2004), Rutan (2006,
2008), Naidu (2008), Windrum et al. (2009).
By heterogeneity is meant both economic inequalities (e.g. in wealth and
income) as well as socio-cultural differences (e.g. in preferences, class, religion).
The main lesson that emerges from literature is that the effect of heterogeneity is
highly context-dependent; it depends on the type of heterogeneity is considered,
socio-cultural or economic, and on how the “success” in the management of
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commons is measured, in terms of collective action or in terms of the level of
the collective good provided1 .
Socio-cultural heterogeneity seems to have a more clearly negative effect
than does economic heterogeneity (Rutan 2006, 2008) in that it may inhibit
the emergence of environment-preserving social norms in the economy. There
are several causal mechanisms according to which socio-cultural heterogeneity
may negatively affect natural resources management; for example, heterogeneity
may inhibit the formation of trusting relationships that are a precondition of
successful collective action (see e.g. Ostrom and Walker 2003) or may prevent
agreement over the allocation of benefits deriving from the resources (see e.g.
Singleton 2001).
The role of economic heterogeneity is less understood. There are a lot of
studies that support a positive correlation between economic heterogeneity and
environment preservation (see e.g. Ruttan and Borgerhoff Mulder 1999, Varugh-
ese and Ostrom 2002, Bardhan and Dayton-Johnson 2002, Dayton-Johnson and
Bardhan 2002). In fact, the existence of “privileged” individuals in the commu-
nity may favor the provision of the collective good via a better internalization
of benefits and costs (the so called “Olson effect”, Olson 1965). However, some
studies find U-shaped correlations between economic heterogeneity and various
measures of success in resources management (see e.g. Bardhan and Dayton-
Johnson 2002, Naidu 2008)2 while others show that inequality may fuel distri-
butional conflicts that inhibit collective action (see e.g. Jhonson and Libecap
1982, Singleton 2001). Exhaustive reviews of the mechanisms found in literature
according to which heterogeneity may influence resources management can be
found in Naidu (2008) and Rutan (2008).
The objective of our paper is to analyze, to our knowledge for the first time,
the effects on environmental dynamics of socio-cultural heterogeneity by a “stan-
dard” overlapping generations model built on John and Pecchenino (1994)’s
seminal work and the subsequent Zhang (1999)’s work, where a simplified ver-
sion of John and Pecchenino’s model is studied. Differently that in Zhang’s
model, where a social planner internalizes intra-generational externalities, we
consider a strategic context in which each agent’s choices are taken on the basis
of the (perfectly foresighted) expected behavior of the other agents. In this
framework, where environmental externalities play a key role not only in de-
termining future generations’ welfare but also in producing intra-generational
undesirable over-exploitation results, we introduce socio-cultural heterogeneity
by assuming that individuals have heterogeneous preferences over consumption
goods and environmental quality.
1 It could be argued that successful collective action is a necessary precondition for the
provision of the collective public good. However, this is not necessarily true (see e.g. Ruttan
1998, 2008) in that privileged individuals may be motivated to unilaterally provide the public
good.
2When inequality is high, the rich unilaterally provides the public good; with low levels
of inequality, all individuals face the same incentives and cooperation emerges. With inter-
mediate levels of inequality, cooperation does not emerge and the rich are not sufficiently
incentivated to unilaterally sustain the cost of environmental managment, so heterogeneity
negatively affects the resource managment.
2
We start our analysis by comparing dynamics in Zhang’s model with those
in ours, in a context of a homogeneous population of agents. The main result
of this part is that strategic behavior of economic agents favors the rise of
complex dynamics in Zhang’s model. In the remaining part of the paper, we
investigate the role of heterogeneity in individuals’ preferences; as in Bosi and
Seegmuller (2008), we adopt a mean-preserving approach according to which
an increase in heterogeneity is defined as an increase in individuals’ dispersion
around a constant mean value characterizing preferences. In such context, we
find that an increase in heterogeneity lowers environmental quality and capital
accumulation evaluated at the unique fixed point of dynamics and favors the
rise of chaotic dynamics.34
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the overlapping
generations model; sections 3-7 analyze it and section 8 concludes.
2 Set up of the model and equilibrium dynamics
We consider an overlapping generations economy where two generations coexist
at each period of time t, the young and the old. The number of individuals be-
longing to each generation is constant and equal to N . Following the framework
of John and Pecchenino (1994), we assume that individuals born at t work only
when they are young and consume only when they are old. At time t, the young
agent i ∈ {1, ...., N} supplies inelastically his time-endowment, normalized to
one, to the productive sector receiving the real wage wt, which is allocated
between savings sit for old-age consumption c
i
t+1 and environmental defensive
expenditures mit aimed at improving the quality of environmental goods at time
t + 1, measured by the quality index Et+1. Individual i’s welfare depends on
cit+1 and Et+1
5 and is represented by a utility function U i(cit+1, Et+1) assumed
twice continuously differentiable, satisfying U i1 > 0, U
i
2 > 0, U
i
1,1 < 0, U
i
2,2 < 0,
U i1,2 > 0 and the Inada conditions.
The consumption good is produced by N identical firms which act compet-
itively; each firm produces output y according to the following Cobb-Douglas
technology:
3The analysis of the interplay between ecological and economic dynamics is a very interest-
ing research field. It is well-known that starting from very simple economic and/or ecological
dynamics the resulting dynamics may be very complex (see e.g. Hommes and Rosser 2001,
Rosser 2001 and 2002, Lamantia 2006, Bischi and Lamantia 2007). In our model, the equa-
tion describing ecological dynamics is linear and augmenting this equation with the effects of
economic activity we obtain dynamics that may be chaotic.
4Several works in economic literature build on the assumption of heterogeneity of economic
agents, however no clear-cut result seems to emerge concerning the role played by heterogeneity
in favoring complex dynamics. In some works (see e.g. Bischi et al. 1999, Bischi and Lamantia
2007, Naimzada and Ricchiuti 2008) heterogeneity fuels complex dynamics while in others the
opposite is observed (see e.g. Bosi and Seegmuller 2008).
5This assumption is adopted in several overlapping generations models (see, among the
others, Zhang 1999, Seegmuller and Verchère 2005). It simplifies our analysis by abstracting
from the consumption-saving choices of agents.
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y = Af(kt) = Ak
α
t
where kt is physical capital per worker, A is a positive parameter representing
technological progress, α ∈ (0, 1).
The evolution of the quality index Et is described by the following linear
difference equation:
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − β
N∑
j=1
c
j
t + γ
N∑
j=1
m
j
t (1)
where (1 − b)Et, b ∈ (0, 1), describes the natural evolution of the environ-
mental quality index in absence of the effects due to economic activity;
∑N
j=1 c
j
t
represents aggregate consumption of old individuals at time t and
∑N
j=1m
j
t rep-
resents aggregate environmental defensive expenditures of young individuals at
time t; the parameters β > 0 and γ > 0 measure, respectively, the negative
impact of aggregate consumption and the efficiency of environmental defensive
expenditures.
When old, individual i supplies his savings sit to firms to be invested in
physical capital and capital accumulation dynamics are given by the following
equation:
N · kt+1 =
N∑
i=1
sit (2)
Savings sit gives rise to the gross return (1+ rt+1− δ), where rt+1 is the real
interest rate and δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of capital. So, individual i
faces the following life-cycle budget constraints:
cit+1 = (1 + rt+1 − δ)s
i
t (3)
wt = s
i
t +m
i
t (4)
At each period t, firms maximize profits; from the usual optimality condi-
tions, the following equilibrium equations for wage and interest rate are ob-
tained:
wt = A · (1− α) · k
α
t (5)
rt = A · α · k
α−1
t (6)
Differently from Zhang’s model, where a social planner solution is studied,
we consider a decentralized allocation problem where individuals act strategi-
cally. In particular, we assume that individual i behaves competitively taking
as given the wage rate wt and the interest rate rt+1; furthermore, in period
t, he observes environmental quality Et and aggregate consumption
∑N
j=1 c
j
t of
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the old generation and formulates expectations about other individuals’ environ-
mental defensive expendituresmjt , j = 1, ....N , j = i. In this context, individual
i maximizes, with respect to the choice variables cit+1, s
i
t and m
i
t, the objective
function:
U i(cit+1, E
e,i
t+1)
under the constraints (3) and (4); Ee,it+1 indicates his expectations about
future environmental quality Et+1:
E
e,i
t+1 = (1− b)Et − β
N∑
j=1
c
j
t + γ
mit + N∑
j=1, j =i
(mjt)
e,i

where (mjt)
e,i represents agent i’s expectations about agent j’s environment
preserving expenditures mjt , j = 1, ....N , j = i.
We assume that individual i maximizes U i, given his expectations about
other individuals’ environmental defensive expenditures; furthermore, we as-
sume that his expectations are correct, that is (mjt)
e,i = mjt , j = 1, ....N , j = i
(ex post) hold. Under this perfect foresight assumption, the first order condi-
tions become:
−U i1(c
i
t+1, Et+1) · (1 + rt+1 − δ) + γ · U
i
2(c
i
t+1, Et+1) = 0 i = 1, ...., N (7)
These implicitly define individuals’ choices mi∗t , s
i∗
t , c
i∗
t , i = 1, ...., N , that
can be plugged in equations (1) and (2) to get the values of Et+1 and kt+1 as
functions of Et and kt only. To make the problem analytically more tractable,
we introduce the same assumption used in Zhang:
Assumption Define
ηi :=
Et+1
cit+1
U i2
U i1
This elasticity parameter is assumed to be constant6 .
Notice that ηi increases if (ceteris paribus) the marginal utility of the envi-
ronmental good increases with respect to the marginal utility of the consumption
good. So a “high” value of ηi implies a relatively high dependence of individual
i’s welfare on environmental quality.
This assumption allows us to derive ci∗t and m
i∗
t in terms of Et and Et+1:
ci∗t = αA
(
Et
γηi
)α
+
(1− δ)Et
γηi
mi∗t = (1− α)A
(
Et
γηi
)α
−
Et+1
γηi
(8)
6The logarithmic, Cobb-Douglas, CES utility functions satisfy this property.
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and to write economic dynamics by a single nonlinear difference equation in
Et:
Et+1 = G(Et) :=
η
N + η
[
(1− b)Et +AN [γ(1− α)− αβ]
(
Et
γη
)α
− βN(1− δ)
Et
γη
]
(9)
where:
η :=
N
N∑
i=1
1
ηi
(10)
is the harmonic mean of the elasticities ηi, i = 1, ...., N .
Analogously to the model of Zhang, environmental and capital accumulation
dynamics are linked by the equation:
kt+1 =
Et+1
γη
Notice that, ceteris paribus, the value of kt+1 is inversely correlated with the
parameter γ, measuring the productivity of the investment in environmental
preservation; in fact, if γ rises, then the opportunity cost of savings for future
consumption increases and, consequently, capital accumulation decreases. The
opportunity cost of savings also increases if the harmonic mean η increases; that
is, if individuals’ preferences become more environment oriented.
3 Fixed points of dynamics
The following propositions deal with the existence and stability conditions of
the fixed points of dynamics (9) and give some comparative statics results. The
proofs are straightforward and are therefore omitted.
Proposition 1 The map (9) admits the fixed point E0ss = 0, for all feasible
parameters’ values, and the interior fixed point:
Ess = γη
[
AN [γ(1− α)− αβ]
β(1− δ)N + γ(N + bη)
] 1
1−α
if γ(1− α)− αβ > 0.
From this proposition we have that the interior fixed point exists only if,
given α, the negative impact of consumption on the environmental resource
(measured by the parameter β) is low enough with respect to the positive impact
of defensive expenditures (measured by γ). Notice that the population size N
and the harmonic mean η do not play any role in the existence conditions for
the interior fixed point; however, we shall see that they play a key role in
determining its stability properties.
The following proposition shows how the interior fixed point Ess varies in
response to variations in the more relevant parameters of the model.
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Proposition 2 The value of Ess is positively correlated with the values of the
parameters γ, η and N and negatively correlated with the value of β.
Remember that β, γ, η and N represent, respectively, the negative impact of
consumption on environmental quality, the efficiency of environmental defensive
expenditures, the harmonic mean of the elasticities ηi and the population size.
It is worth to stress that the positive correlation between Ess and N holds
under the existence condition γ(1 − α) − αβ > 0 of the interior fixed point,
which requires (ceteris paribus) a high enough value of γ with respect to the
value of β.
Let’s now consider local stability properties of fixed points. It is simple to
check that lim
Et→0
G′(Et) = +∞, consequently the fixed point E
0
ss = 0 is always
repulsive. To study the stability properties of the interior fixed point Ess, we
consider the first order derivative evaluated at Ess:
G′(Ess) =
η
N + η
[
1− b(1− α) +
N [αγ − β(1− α)(1− δ)]
γη
]
By straightforward calculations, it is simple to verify that G′(Ess) < 1 for
all parameters’ values. As a consequence, the interior fixed point is locally
attracting if G′(Ess) > −1, while it is repulsive if G
′(Ess) < −1. So, the
following proposition can be stated:
Proposition 3 The fixed point E0ss = 0 is always repulsive while the interior
fixed point is locally attractive if:
N
η
<
γ[2− b(1− α)]
β(1− α)(1− δ)− γ(1 + α)
and repulsive if the opposite inequality holds.
By the above proposition, the interior fixed point is repulsive if, ceteris
paribus, the size N of each generation is high enough or if the harmonic mean
η is low enough. Remember that a “low” value of ηi implies a relatively low
dependence of individual i’s welfare on environmental quality.
In the next sections we compare the dynamics generated by our model with
those in Zhang (1999).
4 Dynamics in an economy with identical indi-
viduals
We first analyze economic dynamics in a population of identical individuals,
that is we assume η = ηi, ∀i, and compare our results with those obtained
by Zhang (1999). To this end, we extend Zhang’s model to the case with N
individuals; the representative agent’s problem in such case becomes:
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max
ct+1,mt,st
U(ct+1, Et+1)
wt = st +mt
ct+1 = (1 + rt+1 − δ)st
Et+1 = (1− b)Et − βNct + γNmt
and the corresponding dynamics are given by:
Et+1 = GZ(Et) =
η
1 + η
[(
(1− b)−
β(1− δ)
γη
)
Et +AN
1−α [γ(1− α)− βα]
(
Et
γη
)α]
The following proposition holds.
Proposition 4 The map (9) admits the fixed point E0Z = 0, for all feasible
parameters’ values, and the interior fixed point:
EZ = ηγ
[
A [γ(1− α)− αβ]
β(1− δ) + γ(1 + bη)
] 1
1−α
N
if γ(1− α)− βα > 0. Furthermore, EZ > Ess always holds.
According to the above proposition, the existence conditions for Ess and EZ
are the same, however the fixed point associated to our decentralized model is
characterized by a greater depletion of natural resources due to underinvestment
in environmental protection.
Notice that EZ is an increasing linear function of the generations size N
while Ess, for N →∞, approaches the limit:
E = γη
[
A [γ(1− α)− αβ]
γ + β(1− δ)
] 1
1−α
Let’s now consider the stability properties of fixed points in Zhang’s model;
it is easy to check that E0Z = 0 is always repulsive and that:
G′Z(EZ) =
η
1 + η
[
1− b+
β(δ − 1) + α[β(1− δ) + γ(bη + 1)]
γη
]
It is interesting to observe that in Zhang’s model the local stability of the
interior fixed point does not depend on the population size N . Furthermore,
the following proposition can be easily checked.
Proposition 5 The inequality |G′Z(EZ)| < |G
′(Ess)| always holds for N > 1.
Therefore, if Ess is locally attractive, then the same is true for EZ ; however,
parameters’ values exist according to which EZ is attractive while Ess is repul-
sive. Consequently, we can say that strategic behavior has a destabilizing effect
on the interior fixed point.
8
5 Some numerical exercises
In this section we show how the introduction of a strategic context in Zhang’s
model makes complex dynamics simpler to emerge. In Figures 1.a-1.d we show
how the parameter N affects the map G and the long run behavior of environ-
mental quality. In such exercise we have posed α = 0.12, β = 0.23, γ = 0.123,
δ = 0.16, η = 0.8, A = 5, b = 0.22. In this context, when N increases, the fixed
point Ess undergoes a period doubling route to chaos7 . For N = 2 the map G
is represented by the dotted line in Figure 1.a and the fixed point is attracting
(see Figure 1.b); for N = 7 the map G is represented by the semi-dotted line
in Figure 1.a and the equilibrium orbits approach a 2-period cycle (see Figure
1.c); for N = 28 the map G is represented by the continuous line in Figure 1.a
and the system becomes chaotic (see Figure 1.d)).
Figure 1: The effects of variations in N on the map G and on the long run behavior of
environmental quality.
In the following numerical exercises we fix α = 0.12, γ = 0.123, δ = 0.16,
η = 0.8, A = 5, N = 4, b = 0.22 and use β as bifurcation parameter. Fig-
ures 2.a and 2.b show the bifurcation windows corresponding to our model and
to Zhang’s one, respectively. In both contexts, both maps undergo a period
doubling route to chaos; however, in our model the start up point of this phe-
nomenon and the subsequent bifurcations occur before than in the other. That
is, in the decentralized economy, complex dynamics occur for lower values of the
parameter β, which measures the negative impact of consumption on environ-
mental goods. We obtain similar results varying the parameter γ, which repre-
sents the efficiency of environmental defensive expenditures. Figures 3.a and 3.b
show the bifurcation windows corresponding to our model and to Zhang’s one,
7Notice, however, that N varies on the integer set.
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respectively, obtained with the parameters’ values: α = 0.1, β = 0.3, δ = 0.16,
η = 0.8, A = 1, N = 2, b = 0.2.
Figure 2: Bifurcation diagrams corresponding to our model (on the left) and to Zhang’s
model (on the right), obtained varying the parameter β.
Figure 3: Bifurcation diagrams corresponding to our model (on the left) and to Zhang’s
model (on the right), obtained varying the parameter γ.
6 Dynamics in a population with heterogenous
individuals
In this section we analyze the context where individuals have heterogeneous
preferences, that is ηi = ηj for i = j. In such case, according to (9), environ-
mental dynamics depend on the harmonic mean of individuals’ elasticities ηi.
This section aims to study the role that an “increase” in heterogeneity plays on
the dynamics of the model. To simplify our analysis, we set N = 2; let η1 and
η2 represents environmental preferences of individuals 1 and 2, respectively. To
introduce a measure of heterogeneity, we adopt a mean-preserving approach (see
e.g. Bosi and Seegmuller 2008) by considering a variation of η1 and η2 such that
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their arithmetic mean ω = η
1
+η2
2
remains constant. Under this assumption, we
can express η1 and η2 as:
η1 = ω −
ε
2
η2 = ω +
ε
2
with ε ∈ [0, 2ω] and substituting in (10) we have that η can be written as a
function of ε and ω:
η(ε, ω) =
(ω − ε
2
)(ω + ε
2
)
ω
= ω −
ε2
4ω
and the dynamics (9) becomes:
Et+1 =
ω − ε
2
4ω
2 + ω − ε
2
4ω
[
(1− b)Et + 2 [γ(1− α)A− αβA]
[
Et
γ
(
ω − ε
2
4ω
)]α − 2β(1− δ) Et
γ
(
ω − ε
2
4ω
)]
(11)
In our analysis, we will take the value of the parameter ε as a measure of
the heterogeneity between the two individuals; that is, heterogeneity increases
if the value of ε increases. The following two propositions hold.
Proposition 6 The interior fixed point of (11) is:
Ess = γ
(
ω −
ε2
4ω
) 2A [γ(1− α)− αβ]
bγ
ω− ε
2
4ω
2+ω− ε
2
4ω
+ 2[γ + β(1− δ)]

1
1−α
Therefore, Ess is a decreasing function of ε.
The above proposition says that if heterogeneity increases, then the fixed
point value of environmental quality decreases. From the derivative:
G′(Ess) =
ω − ε
2
4ω
2 + ω − ε
2
4ω
[
1− b(1− α) +
2[αγ − β(1− α)(1− δ)]
γ
[
ω − ε
2
4ω
] ]
we can observe that an increase in heterogeneity makes η = ω − ε
2
4ω
lower
and the value of |G′(Ess)| consequently increases. In particular, the following
proposition holds.
Proposition 7 The interior fixed point Ess is locally attractive if the following
inequality holds:
ε < 2
√
ω[γω(2 + bα− b) + 2γ(1 + α)− 2β(1− α)(1− δ)]
γ[2− b(1− α)]
It is repulsive if the opposite inequality holds.
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Therefore, an increase in heterogeneity destabilizes the fixed point. Figure
4 shows a bifurcation diagram obtained varying the parameter ε. The other
parameters are fixed at the values α = 0.21, β = 0.35, γ = 0.123, δ = 0.18,
η = 0.8, ω = 0.7, A = 5, b = 0.22.
Figure 4: Bifurcation diagram obtained varying the parameter ε.
Notice that when heterogeneity increases, the dynamics of our model undergo
a period doubling route to chaos. In order to understand the effect of homogene-
ity breaking in the preferences we examine the change in environmental defensive
expenditures of individuals 1 and 2, m1 andm2, when asymmetry is introduced.
For ε = 0, the symmetry implies that the dynamics of environment preserving
expenditures are located on the diagonal∆ =
{
(m1,m2)| m1 = m2
}
of the plane
(m1,m2). Figures 5.a-5.d are obtained posing α = 0.21, β = 0.35, γ = 0.123,
δ = 0.18, η = 0.8, ω = 0.7, A = 5, b = 0.22. The point (m1,m2) = (2.62, 2.62)
is the unique attractive fixed point of these variables for ε = 0 (see Figure 5.a).
With a little increase in ε (ε = 0.2), the fixed point Ess loses its stability through
a flip bifurcation and the environment preserving expenditures follow a 2-period
cycle below the diagonal ∆ (see Figure 5.b). A further increase of the degree
of heterogeneity (ε = 1.04) creates a chaotic attractor below the diagonal ∆
(see Figure 5.c) and the behavior of the environmental defensive expenditures
m1 and m2 follows very different paths as shown in Figure 5.d, where the time
evolution of the difference m1 −m2 is represented.
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Figure 5: The effects of homogeneity breaking in the preferences on environmental defensive
expenditures of individuals 1 and 2, m1and m2.
7 Conclusions
We have analyzed an overlapping generations economy in which individuals act
strategically and are endowed with heterogeneous environmental preferences.
Our model builds on the model of Zhang (1999), where individuals are identical
and decisions are coordinated by a social planner. Comparing the evolution of
environmental quality E generated by our model and by Zhang’s one, we have
showed that both models admit an unique interior fixed point, respectively Ess
and EZ , and that Ess < EZ always holds also in a context in which individuals
are identical and the unique difference between the two models relies on the
strategic behavior of individuals. Introducing heterogeneity, we have proved
that the value ofEss is negatively correlated with heterogeneity, measured by the
parameter ε. This allows us to say that, in our specific context, (socio-cultural)
heterogeneity leads to a higher depletion of environmental resources. Such result
is in line with other findings in environmental economics literature according to
which socio-cultural heterogeneity favors over-exploitation of common access
environmental resources (see the introduction of this paper).
Passing to stability analysis of Ess and EZ , we have shown that, in a context
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with identical individuals, strategic behavior has a destabilizing effect. That
is, for the same parameters’ values, local attractiveness of Ess implies local
attractiveness of EZ , but the vice-versa does not hold. Heterogeneity generates
a further destabilizing effect on Ess; more specifically, Ess becomes repulsive for
a high enough value of ε. This destabilizing effect may favor the rise of complex
dynamics and chaotic behavior via period doubling bifurcations, as numerical
simulations suggest.
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